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This paper adopts an Arendtian approach to consider the interconnections among responsibility, 
ethics, and leadership. Considering responsibility through an Arendtian lens may offer insights 
into leadership ethics. These insights may help deepen our understanding of the nascent theory of 
responsible leadership. In particular, Arendt's emphasis on judgment illustrates the importance of 
responsible action. Engaging with the Arendtian corpus may help us rethink connections among 
leadership, ethics, and responsibility in new and productive ways. This engagement with 
Arendt's work can in turn add value to thinking about responsible, ethics, and leadership. 
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Ethical Responsibility - An Arendtian Turn 
In what ways can Hannah Arendt’s writing add value to current discussions on 
responsible leadership? Considering responsibility through an Arendtian lens offers insights that 
help deepen our understanding of the interconnections among leadership, responsibility and 
ethical action. Engaging with the Arendtian corpus can also add conceptual depth to current 
discussions on responsible leadership and business ethics. This conceptual depth is needed since, 
according to Kempster and Carroll, there is a lack of understanding related to “leadership, 
responsibility, and whole-world challenges.”i Thinking with Arendt can help us better 
comprehend these worldly complexities, not least because she illustrates how lived experience 
shapes theoretical inquiry.ii  
An Arendtian approach can enrich discussions on responsible leadership, because she 
encourages us to think more deeply about what it might mean to act responsibly, and how such 
action connects with ethics. For example, Patricia Werhane calls for business ethicists to utilize 
different mental models to consider an issue from different vantage points.iii Adopting an 
Arendtian approach does precisely that, by highlighting how we need to consider responsibility 
from multiple perspectives to arrive at an informed opinion.  
Furthermore, Arendt’s multidisciplinary perspectiveiv enables her to consider issues in a 
manner informed by particular philosophical traditions, and critical of them. On Arendt’s view, 
to look to philosophy to help individuals act ethically, as this special issue intimates, is to start 
from the wrong place, not least because philosophers have a tendency to privilege abstract 
accounts over those rooted in lived experience. Moreover, in their preference for thinking, 
Arendt accuses philosophers of refusing to care sufficiently for the world. In choosing 
contemplation, philosophers make an active choice to withdraw from the world of others into the 
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private realm of ideas. She argues that this philosophical retreat may encourage solipsistic 
thinking.v Such solipsism leads to a disengagement from the world, and a privileging of self over 
others, which can be detrimental to ethical action. Yet what solipsism does do is illuminate what 
Arendt regards as a paradox, which is that in thinking and acting we exist in two different 
realms. When we act, we exist in a plural realm where we are both subjects and objects, doers 
and spectators. When we think, however, we exist “in the singular, in solitude.”vi In short, Arendt 
views responsibility in opposition to solipsism, which she regards as apolitical and egoistic.vii  
Furthermore, when philosophers retreat to their private world of ideas, Arendt contends 
this allows non-reflective actors to dominate the political stage. To complicate this matter 
further, she notes that when philosophers do engage in politics, the results are not necessarily 
positive, since philosophers are inclined to bring their solipsistic way of thinking to political 
concerns. This solipsistic approach to political matters is undesirable, according to Arendt, 
because it does not allow for engagement with the multiplicity of opinions necessary for a 
flourishing public sphere.viii This plurality of perspectives, so essential for societal well-being is, 
for Arendt, in sharp contrast with the solitary deliberations of the philosopher. In her view, it is 
important to balance political action with philosophical reflection since, ultimately, both are 
necessary for human flourishing. 
Yet rather than considering ethics in terms of human flourishing, Arendt argues that, in 
modernity, we often view ethics through the lens of what is considered socially appropriate. 
What this means is that, instead of listening to our conscience, we go along with others, 
conforming to institutional norms, without considering whether such action is just. This way of 
behaving may lead to a failure to reflect genuinely on the problems of the day. Within the realm 
of business ethics, this can lead to scholars promoting particular theories and ways of being, that 
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may be far more difficult to accomplish in practice than in theory. For example, it can lead to the 
suggestion that we should all act virtuously or believe in the good, without any real connection 
with what is happening either in particular organizations, or society more generally. As Seyla 
Benhabib notes, “philosophical thought suffers from a certain worldlessness precisely because it 
seeks consistency, not perspectivality.”ix Thus, if we are to arrive at a fulsome understanding of 
the interconnections among ethics, leadership and responsibility, we must begin, not with 
abstract philosophical accounts, but with the messy entanglement of everyday existence. By 
focusing on everyday life, we shall see that what constitutes responsibility is far more complex 
than discussions of responsible leadership suggest.  
The following discussion unfolds as follows. We start with a brief review of current 
debates within responsible leadership. The aim here is to explore the main tenets of this new theory, 
and contrast them with Arendtian ideas. Next, as some scholars turn to Emmanuel Levinas, his 
work is briefly considered. Levinas’s ethical approach is rich in considering interpersonal 
relationships, thus enriching current discussions on the connections between responsibility and 
leadership. But Arendt, arguably, provides us with a deeper understanding of collective 
responsibility, which helps us think about responsible leadership in broader contexts. This 
discussion leads us to a consideration of Arendt’s distinction among leadership, leaders, and 
mastery. Then, there is an examination of the dangers of ignoring our individual responsibilities, 
which happens when people confuse unthinking obedience with support for a leader. Leaders who 
demand obedience may render their followers irresponsible. Such irresponsibility is clear in 
Arendt’s account of the trial of the prominent Nazi, Adolf Eichmann. His actions illustrate the 
problems that arise when people obey without thinking. Although his is an extreme case, Arendt is 
highlighting how thoughtlessness leads to irresponsible action. To mitigate such thoughtlessness, 
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she argues, we must pay heed to the life of the mind, especially, judgment. Illustrations of 
irresponsible action are also offered as they concern individual and collective judgment in a 
particular political context. In the conclusion, the different strands of this conversation are drawn 
together to see how thinking with Arendt offers insight into leadership, ethics and responsibility. 
Responsible Leadership 
The theory of responsible leadership emerged a decade ago. Its initial proponents, 
Thomas Maak and Nicola Pless, define responsible leadership as “a relational and ethical 
phenomenon, which occurs in social processes of interaction with those who affect or are 
affected by leadership and have a stake in the purpose and vision of the leadership relationship.”x 
These authors argue the global financial collapse was due to irresponsible action that has 
severely shaken people’s faith in leaders, organizations and governments. Some have called for 
corporate leaders to stop focusing exclusively on profit, and assume social and political 
responsibility with the aim of fostering a global common good. Yet what the “global common 
good” looks like, and how feasible it is to put into practice, may be easier to imagine than to 
achieve.  
Additionally, Maak and Pless acknowledge the need for responsible leadership to be 
fluid, so as to be responsive to different situational contexts. They argue that many scholars view 
responsible leadership as rooted in “a relational, values-centred concept that aims to generate 
positive outcomes for followers and stakeholders.”xi But how these positive outcomes might be 
generated in practice is vague. It is unlikely, for example, that all concerned will agree on what 
constitutes positive outcomes, or that they will even hold shared values. Put simply, in any 
organizational endeavour, some actors may focus on the “bottom line,” while others may be 
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more interested in broader, ethical concerns. Each person may perceive themselves as acting 
responsibly, but how they view responsible action may diverge considerably.xii  
Maak and Pless also contend that responsible leadership requires the cultivation of ethical 
relationships. In practical terms, this requires leaders to co-operate with diverse stakeholder 
groups, and act in an accountable and dependable way. Although accountability and 
dependability are worthy attributes, Kim Cameron suggests there is an important element 
missing in most discussions of responsible leadership. That element is virtuousness, which 
represents “a universal and stable standard of the good.”xiii In Cameron’s view, virtuousness and 
ethics are not the same, because the latter can be affected by situational context, whereas 
virtuousness is not. What is more, he argues, virtuousness is positive because it elevates others, 
and promotes human flourishing. Connecting virtuousness with responsibility is, states Cameron, 
more likely to promote organizational well-being.  
Although some social scientists may regard virtue as philosophically obtuse, Cameron 
maintains many organizations could benefit from virtuous leadership because it “produces 
desirable ends.”xiv Because virtuousness is about goodness and nobility, it “represents the 
unchanging standard by which to make decisions.”xv Stable standards are important for 
organizational well-being, Cameron contends, since without them, leaders may make up their 
own rules. As an example, he points to problems when organizational policies suggest ethical 
obligations, as in the case of Enron, but fail to result in ethical action. Cameron’s supposition 
seems to be that when virtuous action is prevalent, unethical leadership acts are less likely to 
occur.  
The problem with universal claims about virtue, for Arendt, is that virtuous action can 
lead to hypocrisy. Such hypocrisy is dangerous, since people may assume that a leader is acting 
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in their best interests, only to discover later that collective interests were ignored in favor of self-
interest. Following Machiavelli, Arendt declares that it is not virtue that matters to leaders, but 
virtuosity, since glorious deeds reveal the best of humankind.xvi But such virtuous deeds do not 
always produce positive outcomes. To suggest so, as Cameron does, is to ignore the effects of 
contingency.  
Additionally, a significant issue with perceiving virtue as a universal good, as Cameron 
suggests, is that different cultures have contrasting ideas as to what constitutes virtue. Thus, what 
one culture considers virtuous, another may not. Consequently, we must be cautious about 
universal claims about virtue since, as the editors of this journal note, such claims may promote 
‘WEIRD’ thinking.xvii Such thinking merely promotes a Westernized view of the world, ignoring 
how different cultures react in different ways to questions of virtuous conduct. 
Consider, for example, what happened with the Samsung Galaxy 7, widely lauded upon 
its release as the best smart phone to reach the market.xviii But problems with overheating led to 
some of these phones bursting into flames. Subsequently, airlines started to refuse to allow fliers 
to bring these phones on board. The cause of the problem, it appears, was battery malfunctions. 
Samsung’s executive D. J. Koh expressed how the company “feel[s] a painful responsibility for 
failing to test and confirm that there were problems in the design and manufacturing of batteries 
before we put the product out to the market.”xix What Samsung and external experts saw as a 
game changer did indeed change the game, but not as expected. In this case, instead of a star 
product, the company lost billions of dollars, many of its customers, and suffered a loss of face.xx 
Because of Samsung’s market strength nationally and globally, this company’s action not only 
affected the corporation and its customers, it was perceived as a humiliation for South Korea.xxi  
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Waldman and Galvin take a different approach to responsible leadership, contrasting 
economic and stakeholder perspectives to ascertain which is most promising for organizational 
success. From an economic standpoint, these scholars argue leaders must first be accountable to 
shareholders. Such accountability means making strategic decisions calculated to best serve the 
shareholders’ interest. The problem here is that when a leader, or organization for that matter, 
thinks solely in terms of shareholder profit, it can lead to prioritizing short-term economic 
benefits over longer term considerations. For example, most research and development initiatives 
are costly endeavors that rarely show a financial benefit over the short-term. When an 
organization focuses on short-term profit, the long-term benefits from R & D may be ignored. 
Thus, Waldman and Galvin argue that the stakeholder perspective is more promising than the 
economic perspective, because it encourages leaders to consider issues from diverse 
perspectives.  
Although Waldman and Galvin suggest a stakeholder perspective is more robust than an 
economic view, leaders, and their companies, are judged on their economic success. If the 
fundamental purpose of a corporation is to maximize shareholder profits, corporate leaders who 
focus on relationship-building rather than their balance sheets may find themselves out of a job. 
Unless we change the ways that corporations “do” business, it seems unlikely that most business 
leaders will sacrifice profit for the sake of ethics. The competitive demands of the marketplace, 
and the need for short-term profits, are significant factors influencing the actions of senior 
executives in organizations.xxii And when economic factors trump ethical ones, then it is more 
difficult for leaders to act responsibly. Consequently, we need to balance ethics with efficiency if 
we are to encourage ethical leadership.xxiii  
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In addition, while it may be the case that it is more likely for a shareholder to be 
interested in profit than, say, an employee, it would be a mistake to label everyone in the same 
fashion. Although the discussion of multiple stakeholders is more inclusive than one that focuses 
solely on the economic imperative, it is still not rich enough to comprehend the complexity of 
what it might mean to lead responsibly. As Christian Voegtlin demonstrates, there is a lack of 
specificity regarding “the stakeholders’ expectations of a responsible leader, and of the 
challenges of behaving ethically and responsibly as a business leader.”xxiv 
From an Arendtian perspective, there are other conceptual problems with a stakeholder-
centered view. When we equate people with specific roles, we may fail to see them as unique 
human beings. Arendt states,  
In acting and speaking, men show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal 
 identities....This disclosure of “who” in contradistinction to “what” somebody is - his 
 qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings, which he may display or hide - is implicit in 
 everything somebody says and does.xxv 
When we think about people in terms of specific roles, she contends, we ignore their distinctness. 
In doing so, we also lose a sense of the depth of human relationships, and this can lead to 
irresponsible action. In some cases, for instance, leaders view others as resources, rather than as 
unique individuals.xxvi When those in power view employees in this manner, it is easier to see 
employees as “thing like,” and thus easily expendable. The powerful, in turn, lose a sense of 
humanity.  
The preceding section has reviewed key facets of responsible leadership theory, and 
contrasted them with Arendtian ideas. The assumption that “responsible leadership” is broad 
enough to encompass the multiplicity of what it means to act responsibly is limiting to our 
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understanding of responsibility. At this juncture, it may be useful to turn to Emmanuel Levinas 
whose work provides an alternative perspective for researchers interested in the connections 
among responsibility, ethics, and leadership.  
Levinas and Arendt on Responsibility 
Majella O'Leary suggests the turn to responsibility is a result of people’s frustration with 
fraudulent behavior in the corporate sector.xxvii Yet the demands of the economic imperative 
make it difficult for leaders to be genuine in their dealings with others. What is more, as David 
Knights and Majella O’Leary notes, a preoccupation with self can obscure a leader’s ethical 
mindset.xxviii Yet, as Levinas shows us, “ethics cannot exist in the absence of responsibility to the 
other.”xxix For Levinas, we only come to an understanding of the self through our engagement 
with the Other. Yet liberal individualism has, as Knights and O’Leary explain, obscured an 
understanding of intersubjective relationships, and dulled our sense of responsibility. Further, a 
preoccupation with self, a result of solipsistic thinking, promotes self-interest at the expense of 
others’ welfare. This focus on self-interest reduces ethical sensibility. As a consequence, 
“egoistic self-interest overrides any concern with ethics.”xxx  
Conversely, Knights and O’Leary suggest that thinking with Levinas can inspire an 
ethical response. A Levinisian ethics is not a systemic or rule-based approach, but is flexible to 
fit with particular contexts.xxxi As such, a Levinisian ethic of responsibility might enhance the 
work environment, as Jen Jones argues, by revealing how we can engage in ethical 
encounters.xxxii Such encounters are predicated on active listening, and enriched by 
communication. For Levinas, active listening means to engage without judging. Hence it would 
seem that his position is radically different than that of Arendt’s who, as we will see later, saw 
judgment as an important aspect of responsibility. Yet, as Ronald C. Arnett argues, Levinasian 
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ethics is influenced by a concern for justice, as is Arendt’s, and “justice is continually tempered 
by reflections on ethics.”xxxiii My responsibility to others is something, as Arnett notes, I choose 
to take up or ignore. Within a corporate environment when I ignore another person’s plight, 
because I do not want to get involved insofar as doing so might hurts my reputation, we are 
putting our ethical responsibility at risk. In doing so, we not only act irresponsibly but also 
weaken our own humanity. 
Because of his emphasis on ethics, Levinas helps to address questions of responsibility in 
ways Arendt does not. For instance, he argues that the face of the other constitutes his truth.xxxiv 
Chris Ketcham suggests that although individual leaders may be responsible and open to the 
Other, this does not mean that everyone in an organization will be so receptive.xxxv He questions 
whether it is even possible for an organization to do what Levinas asks, that is, put the Other 
before itself. Further, what would this kind of altruistic action mean in business terms? These are 
important questions that business ethicists need to consider before accepting the idea that a 
Levinisian responsibility has practical applications.  
While agreeing with Ketcham that Levinas has high ideals, Jen Jones contends that his 
thinking is grounded in the realities of daily existence.xxxvi She uses the notion of organizational 
dwelling to illustrate how thinking with Levinas offers opportunities to engage in new ways of 
organizing. Dwelling can become “a necessary ground upon which leaders may cultivate 
responsible organizations.”xxxvii Cultivating responsible relationships can enrich organizational 
culture and, hopefully, encourage ethical action.  
Levinas and Arendt have much to offer business ethics, particularly in relation to thinking 
about questions of responsibility and leadership. Both view responsibility as a relational concept. 
For Levinas, ethics is about the self taking responsibility for the Other. For Arendt, responsibility is 
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a broader political commitment. Levinas placed more emphasis on the ethical issues that arise 
between self and other, whereas Arendt emphasizes our collective responsibility to care for the 
world. Exploring how their work is complementary may help us rethink the interconnections 
among ethics, responsibility, and leadership in productive ways.  
From an Arendtian perspective, it is not enough to focus on leaders, or even responsible 
acts. To gain a deeper understanding, we must also consider followers’ responses. In this way, 
we will gain a greater comprehension of the myriad ways in which leadership, ethics, and 
responsible interrelate. At this point, turning to Arendt’s account of the distinction among 
leadership, leaders, and mastery may prove insightful. 
Arendt on Leadership, Leaders, and Mastery 
For Arendt, leadership at its best arises when people come together over common 
cause, and discover their collective strength. It is through this collective strength, for example, 
that a small group of activists can overthrow a dictatorship. Fundamental to an Arendtian notion 
of leadership is the connection between freedom and collective action. For Arendt, freedom finds 
a space to emerge as a result of people acting in concert.xxxviii Historical exemplars of this form 
of leadership include the worker councils that flourished in 19th and early 20th century Europe, 
and the American town hall gatherings in the 18th century.xxxix What makes these gatherings 
important is that people came together to dialogue and debate about matters of interest. Today, 
we might see the groundswell of public action that led to the New Zealand government’s ban of 
the practice of zero hour contractsxl as an example of positive change that occurs when a group 
of people work collectively to overcome structural injustice. When people come together in this 
manner, Arendt maintains that a leader emerges organically to become primus inter pares, first 
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among equals. In turn, the leader is “empowered by a certain number of people to act in their 
name.”xli  
Although Arendt admired certain leaders - Winston Churchill for examplexlii - she 
expressed her disdain for the emphasis on the heroic leader, because it introduces a hierarchy 
into human relationships. She traces the distinction between our modern notion of the primacy of 
the individual leader back to Plato. Following the death of Socrates, Plato wanted to build a 
society founded upon laws to assuage the contingency of action. In his account, the criterion of 
fitness for ruling others became “the capacity to rule one’s self.”xliii Yet Arendt contends this 
focus on the self led to “the fallacy of the strong man who is powerful because he is alone.”xliv  
Instead of regarding a leader as simply primus inter pares in this new iteration, 
sovereignty usurps plurality.xlv This focus on the individual leader is a problem, states Arendt, 
because “the ideal of uncompromising self-sufficiency and mastership is contradictory to the 
very condition of plurality.”xlvi In other words, this is not leadership, but mastery. Thinking about 
leadership as mastery derived from the hierarchical familial relationships of private life.xlvii She 
maintains that philosophers like Plato and Aristotle superimposed this hierarchical structure onto 
political life. But this structure is a perversion of the political, because it is based upon 
hierarchical ways of thinking about human relationships.  
Rather than the collective equality Arendt considers emblematic of leadership, the leader 
is often conceived as someone who envisions something which others then execute. Yet, in her 
view,  
no man can act alone, even though his motives for actions may be certain designs, 
 desires, passions and goals of his own. Nor can we ever achieve anything wholly to plan 
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 (even when, as archôn, we successfully lead and initiate and hope that our helpers and 
 followers will execute what we begin).xlviii  
In this section, we have distinguished between an Arendtian conception of leadership as a 
collective endeavour, the rise of the individual leader, and the notion of leadership as mastery. 
As such, the modern preoccupation with individual leaders obscures what Arendt views as the 
original meaning of leadership as collective action. This preoccupation, in turn, can lead to a 
focus on the individual leader at the expense of others which may, in turn, lead to irresponsible 
and unethical leadership practices. 
 In what follows, we examine Arendt’s argument that there are different types of 
responsibility, and how responsibility connects to questions of guilt. This discussion may 
illuminate some of the complexities regarding our understanding of responsibility. In turn, this 
illumination may shed light on our understanding of the interconnections among leadership, 
ethics and responsibility. 
Responsibility and Guilt 
For Arendt, individual responsibility has three distinct aspects. First, responsibility 
requires us to imagine different viewpoints than our own. Training “one’s imagination to go 
visiting,”xlix she tells us, enables us to enlarge our understanding of a situation, which is crucial 
to our ability to formulate our own view, and judge accordingly. It is this willingness to judge for 
ourselves that is the second distinct aspect of individual responsibility. The third aspect of 
individual responsibility relates to our willingness to act, and be willing to suffer for those 
actions, if need be.  
Further, Arendt distinguishes between collective responsibility and collective guilt. She 
contends the latter term is nonsensical because, if everyone is guilty, then no-one is.l In her view, 
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guilt is always personal whereas collective responsibility is always plural, and hence, political. 
Collective responsibility concerns membership in a particular group with whom we have shared 
interests. However, saying we are collectively guilty for the historical sins of the past can lead to 
phony sentiments. Consider how the governments of Australia and Canada made public 
apologies to their indigenous peoples. These governments admitted that past governments, and 
many non-indigenous citizens, benefited from the poor treatment of indigenous peoples. Because 
non-indigenous citizens benefited from this mistreatment, they are deemed collectively 
responsible. Yet individual citizens cannot be held personally guilty for past acts they did not 
directly commit. Although we may wonder whether these government apologies are a sufficient 
response to past harms suffered by indigenous peoples,li the point is that, for Arendt, there is a 
clear distinction between political responsibilities, which are collective, and moral or legal guilt, 
which pertains to individual acts.  
However, the ability to distinguish between notions of guilt and responsibility is 
complex. This complexity arises, Arendt argues, from the ambiguity with which we use terms 
like “morals” and “ethics.”lii Originally, these terms referred to social customs, and only later did 
they refer to the appropriate conduct of a citizen. From Aristotle through to Cicero ethical 
conduct was related to acting appropriately, especially in connection with political life. 
Christianity was to change the relationship between politics and morality. Instead of being linked 
with political virtues, Arendt contends that morality became connected to the private self, 
specifically, to conscience. This shift explains why so many early Christians' were reluctant to 
enter the political arena, preferring to take care of their souls. Yet this concern with one’s soul is, 
she says, “profoundly unpolitical. For at the centre of politics lies concern for the world, not for 
man.”liii Arendt wants us to spend less time thinking about our mortal salvation, and more time 
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considering how our actions are good for the world we live in. Furthermore, she argues that we 
have a hierarchy of values with morality at the top, and customs and practices at the bottom. But 
this hierarchy of moral values can lead us to ignore the concerns of others.  
In this section, we not only see how complex the idea of responsibility is, but also how 
notions of responsibility relate to ideas of guilt. What is clear, for Arendt, is that if we spend too 
much time fixated on our selves, this fixation can lead us to refuse to take part in public affairs. 
In sum, too much focus on individual morality may be irresponsible, since it can lead to a refusal 
to assist others. When we act, therefore, we need to be cognizant of how those actions may affect 
others. 
Ethical Action 
What constitutes ethical action for Arendt is complex and, at times, contradictory. On the 
one hand, she argues that ethical action is something we learn by being guided by others. On the 
other, she contends that acting ethically is not about good intentions, because we can never know 
the outcome of those intentions when we act upon them. This is one reason why Arendt insists 
that ethics should be divorced from politics. She follows Machiavelli in arguing that it does not 
matter what the political actor thinks is good; what matters is whether that action is good for the 
world. 
 Many have disagreed with Arendt’s distinction between ethics and politics,liv but does it 
have any merit? For example, Angela Merkel’s decision to accept over a million Syrian refugees 
into Germany was widely considered to be a courageous and principled act. However, Merkel’s 
humanitarian gesture may, inadvertently, have influenced far right wing parties to promote 
xenophobia, encouraging ordinary citizens to do likewise. In short, good intentions, once realized 
17 
in the world, do not necessarily lead to positive outcomes. At the same time, being willing to act, 
and bring something new into the world is, for Arendt, a crucial element of ethical action.  
In her discussion of action’s indeterminateness, Arendt draws upon Aristotle’s distinction 
between poiēsis (making) and praxis (action). For Aristotle, praxis is close to performance, 
whereas poiēsis is about production. Therefore, poiēsis is an act with a predetermined outcome. 
In contrast, praxis is an activity without a fixed end. Although a person may have a purpose in 
mind when they act, however, due to contingency, no-one can determine where that action 
will lead. From an Arendtian perspective, praxis does not make anything; that is the job of 
poiēsis.lv  
Alejo José G. Sison argues that [l]eadership is akin to action or praxis, and it is thus 
superior to production or poesis.”lvi Because of the boundless nature of action, the full extent of a 
leader’s acts cannot be foreseen or controlled in the manner in which we construct a building. To 
offer a concrete example, no-one can make America great again, in the manner that President 
Trump suggests, because this is to confuse action with the instrumental activity of making. From 
an Arendtian point of view, there are no absolute guarantees since this ignores how we are 
always acting into the world, and others are responding to our actions. A case in point would be 
the millions of men and women across the globe who protested following the inauguration of the 
45th President of the United States of America, illustrating Michel Foucault’s observation that 
where there is power, there is always resistance.lvii On this point, Arendt would be in full 
agreement. 
In this section, we have seen how Arendt insists we can never know the full extent of our 
actions, because we live in a contingent world. For her, to act is also to suffer. To assuage such 
suffering caused by action, we need the dual aspects of promising and forgiving. In promising, 
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we carry out our pledges to others. Promises are our way of coping with action’s 
unpredictability. Through forgiveness, we excuse those who did not mean to cause harm.lviii 
Moreover, forgiveness and promising are linked temporally, linking our actions with past, 
present and future. As such, promising and forgiving are an integral component of an ethical 
response, because they enable us to deal with the potential problems that may arise from our 
actions.  
In the following section, there is an examination of how failing to reflect on one’s actions 
can prove fatal for others. For our purposes, we will see how unethical action is a result of 
thoughtlessness, combined with an unwavering support for a leader. In both cases, a total lack of 
individual responsibility encourages unethical and, in some cases, violent action. 
Eichmann, Thoughtlessness, and Obedience 
Hired by the New Yorker, Arendt travelled to Israel to cover the trial of the Nazi war 
criminal, Adolf Eichmann. Her subsequent report on his trial created a furor, because of her 
argument that, rather than being an evil maniac, Eichmann’s brand of evil arose from his 
banality. Reflecting upon the controversy surrounding her report, Arendt notes her critics raised 
moral issues she had not anticipated.lix Some critics accused her of being a self-hating Jew, 
because she wrote about the failure of some Jewish leaders to do everything in their power to 
help other Jews. Other critics argued that to judge others is wrong since, under such 
circumstances, each of us might act dishonorably. Arendt disagrees, arguing that a refusal to 
judge for oneself is a failure of personal responsibility. 
In refusing to judge for ourselves, Arendt maintains we mistake obedience for consent. 
Obedience is a problem, she argues, because it can lead us to submit to whatever leaders ask of 
us. Without followers' faithful adherence to a leader's commands, few leaders could accomplish 
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heinous acts. Arendt asserts that “an ardent desire to obey and be ruled by some strong man is at 
least as prominent in human psychology as the will to power.”lx She expressed her astonishment 
when Eichmann professed to have followed Kant’s categorical imperative. In carrying out his 
duties, he followed the “Fuhrerprinzip,” which, Eichmann argued, was the law of the land. Thus, 
he contended not only was his action justified, it was in accordance with Kantian logic. Arendt 
dismisses his claim, arguing his obedience was a result of thoughtlessness and a lack of 
judgment.  
Unthinking obedience ignores our responsibility to judge for ourselves. When people 
start to justify their actions by saying that if they did not carry out a particular order, someone 
else would, we fall into a moral abyss. For Arendt, it is those willing to act contrary to societal 
dictates that are more likely to act responsibly. Such action requires us to judge for ourselves, 
because moral standards may be corrupted by an immoral system masquerading as a just one. 
Consequently, we cannot just adopt societal mores as guides for ethical decision-making. Rather, 
responsible action requires us to think independently.  
 Arendt maintains it was not social conformists, but people who refused to conform that 
did their best to halt Nazi atrocities. In such a crisis, people “had to decide each instance as it 
arose, because no rules existed for the unprecedented.”lxi These non-conformists refused to harm 
another person, thus illustrating the Socratic maxim that it is better not to do wrong, because one 
could not bear the consequences of living with oneself. Moreover, she argues, “a strong 
disinclination to obey is often accompanied by an equally strong disinclination to dominate and 
command.”lxii Consequently, non conformists are important to a flourishing society, since they 
are unwilling to go along with others without taking the time to reflect upon ethical issues with 
regard to such compliance. Here we may think of how whistle blowers in corporations have often 
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led to a change in corporate policies.  
 In this section, we have seen how obedience can render a person thoughtless. A concern 
with thoughtlessness led Arendt in her later work, such as The Life of the Mind, to question 
whether the activity of thinking could render men unwilling to commit evil. Before turning to 
explore her distinction among thinking, willing, and judging, there is a brief exploration of the 
emergence of what she called the social, and its connection to conformity, which may induce 
irresponsible action. 
 Arendt contends that social conformity is a form of rule that is contrary to human 
flourishing. In her view, social conformism arose in the eighteenth century as part of the massive 
social changes from a feudal to a bourgeois society.lxiii Rather than equality for all, the rise of the 
bourgeoisie brought about an entrenched social conformity. For Arendt, this social conformity 
created a kind of ‘no-man rule’ whereby society dictates what people do. Within this societal 
framework, action is subservient to behaviour. People are more likely to conform to social rules 
without thinking. Yet, in this desire for societal acceptance, we may turn away from personal 
values to embrace social standards. When this happens it may become unclear what is our 
individual moral responsibility vis à vis taking a stance against injustice.  In short, social 
conformity may obviate a deeper sense of responsibility.  
If we are to reinvigorate our ethical sense of responsibility then it is necessary to consider 
alternative ways of conceptualizing what it means to be responsible in diverse contexts. One way 
to help us may be through an investigation of what Arendt described as the life of the mind.  
Thinking, Willing and Judging 
Arendt begins The Life of the Mindlxiv by asking whether the activity of thinking 
conditions us against evil-doing. In addressing this question, she shows how understanding the 
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three basic faculties of the mind, that is, thinking, willing, and judging may provide insight into 
why people act irresponsibly and, at times, commit evil acts.  
To begin, Arendt argues that although thinking never makes an appearance in the 
phenomenal world, thinking is connected to experience since “[e]very thought is an afterthought, 
a reflection on some matter or event”lxv By this she means our thoughts are always in touch with 
the world in some fashion, because we are embedded in “a web of relationships.”lxvi She 
distinguishes between cognitive and reflective thought, seeing the former as useful to knowledge, 
and the latter as critical to understanding. Engaging in reflection enables us to do what Arendt 
calls “the stop and think,” meaning to think through a problem from different perspectives. 
Following Kant, she contends that reflective thinking “is not the prerogative of the few but an 
ever-present faculty of everybody.”lxvii Conversely, an inability to reflect is “the ever-present 
possibility for everybody to shun that intercourse with oneself.”lxviii Reflective intercourse is, for 
Arendt, an ethical response that demonstrates our willingness to consider a problem from diverse 
perspectives. What reflective thinking does is to prepare the way for decision-making, where I 
judge the appropriateness of engaging in a particular activity, or taking up a position on an issue.  
Reflective thinking, as Arendt understands it, is not about obtaining specific results, but 
about obtaining greater understanding. Conversely, an unwillingness to think for oneself, such as 
when we abide by societal rules without considering their implication, is a problem, because we 
are not always aware of whether those rules are just. (As we saw earlier, for Arendt, this is the 
problem with obedience.) She urges us to think for ourselves, and use our imagination to 
consider a problem more thoroughly. Yet “[t]he quest for meaning, which relentlessly dissolves 
and examines anew all accepted doctrines and rules, can at any moment turn against itself.”lxix As 
such, Arendt declares “there are no dangerous thoughts; thinking itself is dangerous.”lxx The 
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reason why thinking is dangerous is because our thoughts are unpredictable. Consequently, we 
cannot know where our thoughts will lead, or whether our thinking is likely to be productive. 
Thinking is in contrast to the second feature of the life of the mind, namely, willing.  
Willing 
 For Arendt, willing was a central feature of Christian ethics. Beginning with the writings 
of St. Paul, disobedience becomes man's greatest moral sin, while obedience became the ethical 
foundation of Christian teaching. Christian ethics emphasizes self-knowledge which, in turn, 
altered ideas regarding human freedom. Arendt writes: 
 According to our tradition of conceptual thought and its categories, freedom is equated 
 with freedom of the will, and we understand freedom of the will to be a choice between 
 givens, or to put it crudely, between good and evil.lxxi  
This focus on the will meant that early Christian philosophers, such as Augustine, began asking 
questions concerning the inward life. He writes, for example, “I have become a question for 
myself,” a query Arendt contends early Greek philosophers did not engage in, since the inner 
life, or subjectivity as we understand it, only became of interest with Christianity.lxxii In 
Augustine’s view the will is monstrous since, while the mind commands the body, it cannot 
command the will. Additionally, he argued every man is a new beginning with the capacity to 
will to do something or not. Building on Augustine, Arendt maintains that “spontaneity is part 
and parcel of the human condition. Its mental organ is the Will.”lxxiii So our understanding of 
human agency, then, is connected to our thinking about the will. 
  The important aspect pertinent for this discussion is that individual will places a greater 
emphasis on self at the expense of human relationships, and thinking about the world more 
generally. Too much emphasis on the will encourages us to focus on our personal desires without 
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considering the effects on others, which can lead to irresponsible action. Consider, for example, 
how Maak, Pless and Voegtlin argue that a significant factor in enhancing responsible leadership 
is for CEOs to place their organization’s fiduciary responsibility first.lxxiv Yet a new report by 
researchers at the University of Lancaster found that “the median FTSE 350 company generated 
little in the way of a meaningful economic profit over the period 2003-2014.”lxxv At the same 
time, senior executive pay increased by more than 80%. Now if a CEO’s foremost responsibility 
is the corporation’s financial health, would it not make more sense to take a smaller salary until 
the company is in better financial health? Here is where the desire for success in personal 
financial terms may actually obscure the judgment of senior executives. For Arendt, judging is a 
responsible act, because it requires us to consider diverse viewpoints, rather than focus on our 
own desires.  
Judgment 
Having the courage to judge is crucial to an Arendtian ethical worldview. Her comments 
on judgment build upon Kant's Third Critique.lxxvi Concentrating on the notion of individual taste 
- that is, why we like some things and not others - she rethinks Kantian ideas in an unusual, and 
some have argued, idiosyncratic manner.lxxvii Arendt argues that Kantian judgment differs from 
practical reason, since “practical reason ‘reasons’ and tells me what to do and what not to do; it 
lays down the law and is identical with the will, and the will utters commands; it speaks in 
imperatives.”lxxviii Arendt distinguishes between the will as the voice of command, and that of 
judgment, which she argues arises out of a contemplative pleasure. lxxix The will is concerned 
with the self whereas, Arendt contends, judging requires us to take into account different 
perspectives. As she states “the more people’s positions I can make present in my thought and 
hence take into account in my judgment, the more representative it will be.”lxxx By imagining an 
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issue from different perspectives, we are better able to respond in a more responsible manner to 
the situation at hand. For Arendt, judgment is the political faculty par excellence; it helps us not 
only to decide on the right course of action but also to have a measured response to 
circumstances. In summation, Arendt’s distinctions among thinking, willing and judging help us 
to understand why it may be that we act irresponsibly. What is clear is that, from an Arendtian 
perspective, to act responsibly, we need to engage in reflective thought, and have the courage to 
judge for ourselves.  
To offer a concrete example of what could be called poor judgment, it might prove 
worthwhile to examine Great Britain’s referendum decision to leave Europe (hereafter Brexit). 
Brexit illustrates Arendt’s concern regarding the effects of lying and irresponsibility in politics. 
This example also illustrates how essential it is to be willing to judge an issue from multiple 
perspectives. 
Lying, Irresponsibility, and Politics  
In the Brexit campaign, there were many examples of irresponsible leadership and poor 
judgment. We might start with the ill-judged action of Britain’s former Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, in seeking the referendum in the first place. But there were more egregious examples 
of irresponsibility. Let us take but one example. The “Leave” team, whose leaders included Boris 
Johnson (former Mayor of London) and Nigel Farage, (ex leader of United Kingdom 
Independence party) adopted the slogan: “We send the EU $50 million a day, let’s fund our NHS 
instead.”lxxxi This slogan was wrapped around a red bus, and served as the backdrop for media 
photographs. However, this statement is factually incorrect. The annual figure of $350m is a 
gross figure for the UK contribution to the European Union, out of which the UK gets an 
automatic rebate of £74m per week.lxxxii Furthermore, the remaining monies are used as subsidies 
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for farmers, university researchers and aid payments to particular regions. When pressed by 
various reporters, the Leave team admitted that their figures were incorrect, and yet this did not 
stop them from continuing to use this false slogan on advertisements. 
For their part, it is often easier for voters to believe in simple slogans than to take time to 
consider the factual content of political discourse. This lack of interrogation of political discourse 
is irresponsible since, as Arendt might argue, citizens are not doing due diligence in assessing the 
factual content of a claim. In their defence, one could argue that it becomes difficult for citizens 
to ascertain the truth when politicians are so keen to ignore the facts, or to provide us with 
alternative ones. In ignoring facts, politicians are acting irresponsibly, and encouraging citizens 
to do likewise. Some members of the media are also behaving irresponsibly in their assertion that 
we live in a “post truth” world. All this assertion does, as the philosopher Charles Taylor reminds 
us, is to encourage “magical thinking”lxxxiii where factual evidence is perceived as less important 
than personal opinion.  
The example from Brexit, it seems to me, shows the powerful effects of political 
irresponsibility, both by leaders and citizens. Such irresponsibility has a major effect on the 
ethical well-being of a nation. Arendt argues that lying dominates the political landscape. Such 
deceit can have serious repercussions on people’s ability to grasp the difference between truth 
and falsehood.lxxxiv Citizens fail in their responsibility to protect the political space when they are 
not prepared to do due diligence, and assess a situation from different perspectives. Conversely, 
through judging we can “enlarge our mentality,” and take into account diverse views so as to 
judge a situation for ourselves in an enriched manner. Such enrichment is a result of our being 
willing to consider the perspectives of others. 
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Arendt reminds us that each “man has his own doxa, his own opening to the world.lxxxv” 
That is, each of us views a situation slightly differently, as a result of our unique experiences, as 
well as our culture, and identity. Allowing people to express themselves is critical to a 
flourishing public space. But when we invite others to speak their minds, they may say things 
that we do not agree with, or find abhorrent. Such is the paradox we face when we allow diverse 
opinions to be voiced. The way of dealing with this paradox is by people recognizing that 
violence has no place in the public realm. As such, each of us has a responsibility to voice our 
opinions in a way that is not harmful to another. A plurality of perspectives is critical to human 
flourishing because, as Arendt reminds us, it is “far easier to act under conditions of tyranny than 
it is to think.”lxxxvi 
Discussion, Implications, and Future Directions 
In a special issue dedicated to “Philosophical Approaches to Leadership Ethics,” it may 
appear something of a contradiction to discuss problems one thinker sees with a philosophical 
turn. Yet turning to Arendt can enrich our thinking about what constitutes responsible leadership, 
not because she is unaware of philosophical arguments, but rather because she is so immersed in 
them. Even when critiquing philosophy, her approach is always philosophically grounded. 
Arendt’s phenomenological approach allows her to build on the work of philosophers she 
admired, such as Kant and Socrates, while also revealing problems with philosophical accounts 
that privilege solipsistic thinking.  
There are, however, limitations with an Arendtian approach. One such limitation relates 
to Ciulla’s call for scholarship that focuses on good leadership. Arendt was troubled by notions 
of the good, because she saw these notions as creating artificial ideals that do not translate into 
real-world predicaments. The good, Arendt contends, is concerned with the self, and how we 
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perceive our conduct. What is missing, she maintains, is a broader understanding of ethics that 
starts not from our care for the self, but rather from our care for the world. In trying to define 
what good leadership might be, Arendt argues we restrict our thinking. That may be so, but it 
leaves us without a firm foundation from which to think about what constitutes good leadership.  
In thinking with Arendt, we see how important it is to consider responsibility from 
multiple perspectives. But how else might we apply Arendt’s political ideas to business ethics? 
Graham K. Henning argues that one fruitful approach may be to rethink business as an Arendtian 
polis. (Of course, cynics might argue we need to rethink the polis to be less like a business.) 
Such rethinking, Henning argues, would require establishing greater trust between senior 
executives and other employees. In his view, “empowerment and good management practices are 
not simply nice to have, they are important for the freedom of human beings and for good 
corporate functioning.”lxxxvii Good corporate practices not only enhance employee’s working 
environment, they make economic as well as ethical sense.  
Responsible leadership, as with so many other leadership theories, is a theory of the 
good. Such theories are often well-meaning, but lacking in complexity. This lack may be one 
reason why Kempster and Carroll call for new approaches to responsible leadership that examine 
“the shortfalls of traditional ways of thinking about leadership, alongside new possibilities for its 
redefinition and redevelopment.”lxxxviii Corporate leaders must acknowledge their responsibility 
to others. Such acknowledgement is not just responsible, it has far-reaching potential to enable 
the kind of “global good” that Maak and Pless advocate for in their theory of responsible 
leadership. What will be crucial, however, is to ensure this kind of revitalization occurs. For that 
to happen, we need the will of governments, as well as corporations and citizens. Is such a 
transformation possible? It seems unlikely. Yet, Arendt suggests that the future is always 
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different from what we might imagine. That is why, in her view, we need to have collective hope 
in humanity. As such, developing potential frameworks that privilege ethical considerations over 
economic deliberations, or at least bring the two into harmony, is not a bad place to craft a new 
beginning. 
 Although Arendt does not provide us with an abstract concept of the good, if we 
reconfigure Ciulla’s call, not for good leadership per se, but its enactment, perhaps Arendt 
provides us with a starting place from which we can build upon the nascent theory of responsible 
leadership. Specifically, her emphasis on leadership as collective action enables us to consider 
the interconnections among ethics, responsibility and leadership in new ways. Of course, Arendt 
might say this is not a new paradigm, but rather a reaching back to the essence of leadership, to 
what we have long known, but collectively forgotten. 
If there is an essential Arendtian view of leadership, it is to view leadership as collective 
action. Such action emerges from the heart of life in all its expansive and messy disarray, not as 
consensus, but as a comingling of viewpoints. As Ronald C. Arnett notes, encouraging robust 
public dialogue does not equate to consensus even, or perhaps especially, when we deal with 
controversial issues.”lxxxix Such a robust dialogue is good in an Arendtian sense because it allows 
for the richness of human plurality to shine forth. But that richness needs also to be tempered by 
a respect for the Other, as Levinas reminds us. And, for Arendt, this is where reflection and 
judgment may help us to act more responsibly.  
Arendt maintains that reflection is important to individual judgment. Reflecting upon a 
problem enables us to judge a particular issue from a multiplicity of angles. In so doing, we may 
be able to act in a more responsible and responsive manner. That said no-one judges well on 
every occasion. xc What is important is that we are courageous enough to make an individual 
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judgment, even when it is likely to prove unpopular. Engaging in reflection may help us to 
develop the kind of judgment that leads to responsible and ethical action. But we must also 
recognize that we have a responsibility, not just to voice our own perspective, but to honour that 
of others.  
It has been asserted here that responsibility - both collective and individual - is an 
important dimension of leadership ethics. Arendt’s work can add richness to our ethical 
discussions. She implores us to think carefully about our theoretical assumptions, as well as our 
own praxis. This engagement with Arendt is not intended to be the last word on the topic. Rather, 
the aim is to encourage others to join me in considering leadership, ethics and responsibility 
through an Arendtian lens. Her work has much to offer, allowing us to explore leadership 
inquiry, and business ethics in new and productive ways.  
Arendt reminds us that our collective task is to care for the world before ourselves. Yet, 
arguably, we are living at a time of irresponsible leadership, as many leaders place self-interest 
before the well-being of others. Arendt viewed the political as the arena where we have the 
greatest potential for human flourishing. Yet what we witness on our global stage is too much 
grandstanding, and narcissism on behalf of political and corporate leaders. In turn, many 
individuals refuse to take the time to reflect, and use their judgment to ascertain the difference 
between fact and opinion. This collective failure of judgment has dire implications for our ability 
to care for each other.  
By way of conclusion, in a letter to her friend, Meieir Cronenmeyer, Arendt writes “[i]t 
really is important to me to create the foundations of a new political morality although out of 
modesty I never did say so explicitly.”xci Such a political morality requires us to show through 
our actions how much we care, not just for ourselves, but for others and the world. If we love the 
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world, as Arendt certainly did, then it behooves us to take responsibility, not only for what we 
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